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Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending
by John Feffer
South Korea is currently engaged, once again, in a large-
scale, expensive modernization of its military that aims 
to provide the country with a more robust and self-suffi -
cient defense. The timing of this considerable increase in 
military spending might seem, at fi rst glance, rather odd. 
Korean economic growth has been relatively anemic in 
the past few years. Meanwhile, the conventional military 
power of its chief adversary, North Korea, has steadily 
declined, and, until recently, South Korean leaders were 
committed to expanding inter-Korean cooperation. In an-
other irony, the current Lee Myung-bak administration 
has simultaneously pushed a much harder line on North 
Korea and reduced the level of spending projected by the 
previous Roh Moo-hyun government.
Although the North Korean threat still serves to justify 
military spending in the South, other rationales have 
gained prominence, such as perceptions of a weakening 
U.S. security commitment, “unspecifi ed” threats or inse-
curity in the region, and the technological requirements 
of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). But another 
rationale has shaped South Korean military spending, 
and this rationale may become even more salient during 
this period of global economic crisis. Successive South 
Korean governments have argued that growing the mili-
tary and localizing production is good for the economy.
On the face of it, this economic argument makes intuitive 
sense. Large-scale military spending accompanied South 
Korea’s spectacular rise to the commanding heights of 
the global economy. Indeed, the defense industry in some 
ways led the industrialization process. “We made tanks 
before we made cars,” recalls Kim Jong-dae, editor of 
Diplomacy and Defense Focus.1 Today, the country’s 
military industry employs a little more than 20,000 peo-
ple directly and more than 50,000 indirectly, and it accounts for 
sales of roughly $5.7 billion, including more than $1 billion in 
exports in 2008.2 These are not small fi gures. Yet, critics charge 
that government funds could be more profi tably invested in 
civilian sectors of the economy to better utilize research and 
development (R&D) funds and contribute more to economic 
growth. The fl ip side of the economic argument—that a nation-
al economic slowdown intensifi ed by a global recession neces-
sitates a less ambitious military modernization—has generated 
a different set of controversies concerning the sequencing of 
defense reform and the allocation of scarce resources.
This paper will explore these various controversies, which have 
pitted academic against academic, government offi cial against 
government offi cial, ally against ally, and even army against 
navy and air force. It will examine the nature of South Korean 
military spending, the outlines of the debate around the current 
modernization, and the push and pull factors that drive bud-
getary increases. It will look at the domestic economic (and 
inevitably political) impact of more won going into the de-
fense sector. And it will assess whether South Korea’s military 
transformation refl ects and contributes to a regional arms race, 
which in turn has economic consequences of its own.
The paper will conclude that economic arguments for increased 
military spending are at best weak, at worst counterproductive, 
and, in general, irrelevant. For all the effort expended by econo-
mists and government offi cials to translate military spending 
into economic advantage, the primary rationales for the size 
and type of defense spending are noneconomic. Ultimately, 
then, the debate over South Korean military spending, what-
ever its economic implications, must take place at a different 
level of discourse.
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Figure 1: Military Spending by the Republic of 
Korea, 1961–2006, percentage of gross domestic 
product
Source: “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, 14 January 2009.
Figure 2: Military Budget of the Republic of Korea,
1988–2007, in constant 2005 U.S. dollars, billions
Source: “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, 14 January 2009.
The domestic factors behind these changes often came 
with economic justifi cations. For instance, advocates of 
the dramatic spending increases pointed to the decline 
in GDP percentage devoted to military spending in the 
1990s and argued that this had resulted in an insuffi cient-
ly equipped and trained military.9 A second domestic 
push factor was technology. The RMA, which applied 
the latest information and communication technologies 
to the security sphere, fi rst swept through the Pentagon 
and subsequently through the armies of U.S. allies. As 
a leader in information technology (IT) and commu-
nications, South Korea was well placed to initiate this 
RMA, which it did under Kim Dae-jung (and continued 
under Roh Moo-hyun). It relied on spin-on innovations 
coming from these sectors—as well as heavy machin-
ery, shipbuilding, transportation, and aerospace—to up-
grade its military capabilities.10 A third imperative was 
demographics. The South Korean army could count on 
approximately 400,000 draft-age young men annually 
from 1977 to 2003. Because of Korea’s falling birthrate, 
the number was expected to drop to 317,000 in 2008 and 
Push Factors
When it comes to the economics of military spending—
as with the economics of development overall—South 
Korea has been somewhat of an outlier. After many econ-
omists had concluded that high rates of military spend-
ing diverted precious investment resources in develop-
ing countries, South Korea proved to be an “interesting 
anomaly” as it devoted huge resources to the military 
and yet made almost unprecedented leaps in economic 
growth.3 After many economists had concluded that 
small countries could not profi tably maintain indigenous 
arms manufacturing capabilities, South Korea again 
proved them wrong by becoming a leading arms-export-
ing nation. Just as it deliberately “got the prices wrong” 
on economic development, in Alice Amsden’s memo-
rable phrase, South Korea also seemed to get the prices 
wrong on military development, at least as it related to 
the economy.4
From nearly its inception as a country, South Korea has 
devoted a signifi cant portion of government spending to 
the military. In the mid-1970s, after devoting roughly 
4 percent of gross national product to defense spend-
ing since 1963, the government increased that share to 
6.3 percent (in 1976) and continued at levels of about 5 
percent until the late 1980s. Throughout this period, de-
fense absorbed roughly one-third of government expen-
ditures.5 After 1988, when defense expenditures came in 
at 4.2 percent of gross domestic product, the percentage 
steadily declined through the 1990s, reaching 2.5 percent 
in 2006 (Figure 1).6 Despite this declining percentage, 
however, South Korea’s expanding economy guaranteed 
larger and larger shares for the defense sector (Figure 
2), with an overall 81 percent increase in military spend-
ing from 1999 to 2007 (44 percent increase in infl ation-
adjusted dollars).7
The latest modernization plan, launched by the Roh 
Moo-hyun administration in 2006, consisted of several 
interlocking proposals. Among these, the Korean gov-
ernment proposed to:
Increase signifi cantly its military spend-• 
ing—by approximately 10 percent a year 
between 2008 and 2020—with a focus on 
“force improvement projects”;
Reduce military manpower by approxi-• 
mately 25 percent by 2020;
Localize more arms production and take ad-• 
vantage of “spin-on” technologies;8 and
Shift budget priorities from the army to the • 
navy and air force in order to bolster rapid-
response capabilities.
%
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233,000 by 2025.11 This stark reality informed the De-
fense Reform 2020 directive to reduce Korean military 
manpower from its level of nearly 700,000 soldiers in 
2005 to 500,000 by 2020.12
To address these issues of insuffi ciency, technology, and 
demographics, the Korean defense reform proposed sig-
nifi cantly higher spending on new high-tech equipment, 
which would simultaneously compensate for lower 
military manpower, correct the downward trajectory of 
overall military spending as a percentage of GDP, and 
transform capabilities in the direction of RMA. The new 
capabilities, concentrated in the navy and air force, were 
dazzling in many respects: a blue-water navy with the 
fi rst Aegis-equipped destroyers, SM-6 ship-to-air mis-
siles, AWACS aircraft, new F-15K fi ghters, and Global 
Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles. These capabilities did 
not come cheaply. One Aegis-equipped destroyer alone 
cost the Korean government approximately $1 billion.
The focus on the navy and air force was intentional. 
“When he was elected [as] president, Roh Moo-hyun and 
his staff came up with an overall assessment,” remembers 
Moon Chung-in, who served in the Roh administration.
We discovered that the force structure was ex-
tremely backward. Ground forces counted for 
70–80 percent of combat forces. The air force 
and navy had minimal force. In terms of the 
threat assessment, Roh Moo-hyun thought that 
the conventional threat from North Korea could 
be managed. But he was concerned about future 
strategic uncertainty in Northeast Asia.13
Regardless of the rationale, this interservice competition 
was a key driver of higher military spending.
The Defense Reform 2020 plan was not implemented 
quite as planned. Not surprisingly, the army resisted the 
cutbacks in manpower and the preferential treatment 
accorded the navy and air force. Conservatives wanted 
to refocus on the North Korean threat rather than on re-
gional insecurity. Critics complained that the Roh gov-
ernment based its projections on the unlikely prospect of 
GDP growth continuing at a 7 percent rate,14 and the Ko-
rea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) recommended 
reducing budget increases on the front end in favor of 
greater increases down the line.15 One side claimed that 
the increases were not suffi cient for “true military self-
reliance.”16 The other side—progressive groups outside 
the administration and the Ministry of Planning and Bud-
get from within—complained that the military spending 
increases were too high.17
In the end, economics proved decisive. Roh, on discover-
ing that there simply were not enough funds to cover his 
proposed changes, reduced the average increases from 
roughly 10 percent annually to roughly 8 percent in 2006 
(however, the increases rose to 8.8 percent in 2007 and 
2008).18 Lee Myung-bak, on taking power, reduced the 
2009 budget fi gure further to 7.5 percent, with at least 
a partial restoration of emphasis on the army to counter 
the North Korean threat.19 The global fi nancial crisis, in 
depressing South Korean growth rates even more, may 
contribute to these downward pressures.20
Pull Factors
The external pull factor that has traditionally served as the 
rationale for increases in South Korean military spending 
is North Korea—though actual military increases rarely 
corresponded to specifi c improvements in North Korean 
capabilities. Nevertheless, the country that once could 
match South Korea in spending and capabilities was but 
a shadow of itself by the 1990s.
Even though it continued to allocate a large percentage 
of government spending to the military (somewhere be-
tween 14 percent and 33 percent, depending on whether 
you listen to Pyongyang or Washington) and even though 
its defense budget has been rising in absolute terms (to 
around $470 million in 2006),21 North Korea has simply 
not been able to keep up (Figure 3). A country spending 
approximately half a billion dollars on defense each year 
simply cannot compete with one spending more than $20 
billion. Indeed, it has been evident since the late 1990s 
that “the South is far superior to the North in military 
as well as overall capabilities,” which a focus on bean 
counting (numbers of soldiers, numbers of tanks) often 
obscures.22 Moreover, whereas North Korea might have 
been able to count on allies to make up the difference in 
capabilities in the 1970s and 1980s, those allies shifted 
into neutral in the 1990s—at least on the issue of support-
ing any North Korean military offensive.23 In addition to 
the decline in North Korea’s conventional capabilities, 
the two Koreas began an intensive process of rapproche-
ment in the late 1990s. By 2004, South Korea stopped 
labeling North Korea as its “main enemy” in its defense 
white papers. And the Roh administration launched its 
Defense Reform 2020 plan “amid expectations that 
the North Korean military threat would be decreased 
further.”24
Even under Roh Moo-hyun North Korea retained a 
measure of threat. In its 2006 white paper, the Korean 
government argued that “North Korea’s conventional 
forces, its nuclear test, weapons of mass destruction and 
the forward deployment of troops are a serious threat to 
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our security.”25 South Korean military offi cials worried 
about North Korea’s “asymmetrical capabilities,” namely 
weapons of mass destruction and artillery pieces within 
range of Seoul.26 And the Lee administration, with its tra-
ditional view of North Korea, has amplifi ed the rhetoric 
on the importance of combat readiness.27
Figure 3: Comparison of Military Spending in the 
Republic Korea and in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, 2004–06, in U.S. dollars, billions
Source: “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute, 14 January 2009; Yonhap News 
Agency.
But neither North Korea’s declining capabilities under 
the two Kims, nor rapprochement under Roh, nor more 
aggressive rhetoric under Lee appear to have had the di-
rect effect on the levels of South Korean military spend-
ing that one might expect from the Cold War dynamic on 
the Korean peninsula. South Korean spending went up in 
the fi rst two cases—and most dramatically at precisely 
the time of greatest rapprochement—and moderated in 
the last case. To understand the dynamics of South Ko-
rean military spending, we must look to other external 
factors.
Chief among these has been the United States. Signifi -
cant spikes in South Korean military spending have oc-
curred three times in South Korean history, each one 
corresponding with perceived or actual changes in U.S. 
defense posture in the region. The fi rst, Park Chung-hee’s 
emphasis on a self-reliant defense, came in the wake of 
U.S. troop reductions pushed through by President Rich-
ard M. Nixon in the early 1970s.28 The second came at 
the end of the 1980s when Roh Tae-woo used similar 
language—the “Koreanization of Korean defense”—in 
response to U.S. military transformation at the end of the 
Cold War.29 Finally, the efforts by Kim Dae-jung and par-
ticularly Roh Moo-hyun have represented a third wave in 
Korean military spending, again a modernization effort 
in response to U.S. global force transformation.
In this most recent modernization, the drawdown of U.S. 
troops, the relocation of U.S. bases, the removal of the 
U.S. trip wire, and the handover of wartime military con-
trol—changes largely planned since the 1990s but accel-
erated during the tenure of Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld—all contributed to intensifying fears of en-
tanglement prominent among Roh Moo-hyun supporters 
and raising fears of abandonment.30 South Korean offi -
cials began to look into acquiring many if not all of the 
high-tech capabilities provided by the United States in or-
der to fi ll the anticipated gap. As military analyst Hamm 
Taik-young points out, the traditional “division of labor 
[was] between U.S. software and Korean hardware.”31 
So, South Korea rushed to acquire surveillance and com-
mand, control, computers, communications, and intelli-
gence (C4I) capabilities. But in the alliance relationship, 
the United States has also traditionally provided naval 
and air force power, while South Korea has concentrated 
on the army.32 So, in its modernization, South Korea also 
began to beef up naval and air power (KDX-III, F-15K), 
and army fi repower (self-propelled artillery).33 The shift 
in wartime military control created additional anxieties 
that U.S. forces—such as battle groups—would be either 
unavailable or delayed if requested by South Korea in 
an emergency.34 This anxiety persisted despite arguments 
that, although the shift in wartime control would weak-
en alliance cohesion, “it would not necessarily trigger a 
reduction and withdrawal of American forces.”35 Gen. 
Walter Sharp’s recent reassurances about U.S. commit-
ments and capabilities did little to assuage these anxieties 
since Washington is simultaneously planning to transfer 
40 Apache helicopters from South Korea to Afghanistan, 
forcing Seoul to consider additional helicopter purchases 
to compensate for the loss.36
The United States infl uenced South Korean military 
spending in other ways as well. There are the costs of the 
alliance in general (South Korea will pay 760 billion won 
in 2009 for joint operations and will increase its share 
each year until 2013) and the ongoing base relocation in 
particular (South Korea will pay 5.59 trillion won for the 
Yongsan relocation while the United States will provide 
4.4 trillion won). Then there is the cost of maintaining 
the interoperability of allied forces through the import of 
U.S. military goods. In 2007, South Korea bought about 
$900 million worth of arms, 95 percent of which came 
from the United States.37 This fi gure will likely grow as 
the U.S. Congress recently upgraded South Korea’s mili-
tary procurement status to the level of Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, and NATO members.
The United States has used interoperability as a way to 
infl uence South Korea’s purchasing decisions, for exam-
ple, twisting arms to persuade South Korea to purchase 
$ billions
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Boeing F-15Ks rather than French Rafales or Russian 
Sukhoi Su-35s.38 Also, as the United States upgrades its 
forces in line with RMA, South Korea has no choice but 
to do the same, for the dance partner who fails to follow 
the lead will eventually be exchanged for another. These 
overall alliance costs fall into the category of “asset spec-
ifi city,” namely the capabilities that have built up over the 
course of the U.S.-ROK military alliance and that require 
continual funding to sustain.39 Also part of the economic 
equation is the large amount of money that United States 
Forces Korea has directly contributed, through purchas-
ing, to the Korean economy.
North Korea and the United States are not the only exter-
nal factors behind South Korean military spending. Most 
controversial are the “unspecifi ed threats.” At least with 
North Korea and the United States, the drivers of mili-
tary spending increases provide some target fi gures: bal-
ancing North Korea’s defense spending or capabilities, 
compensating for the loss of U.S. troops or technology. 
Unspecifi ed threats—like countering terrorism, protect-
ing sea lanes for commercial shipping, or preparing for 
potential confl icts with China or Japan—form an open-
ended category. “This is the problem,” says Suh Choo-
suk of KIDA. “How much suffi ciency do we need to face 
unspecifi ed threats?” According to Kim Jong-dae, some 
conservatives within Korean society have grander ambi-
tions: “‘Why are we only thinking about North Korea, 
why don’t we become a superpower?’ they ask. That acts 
as a reason for developing the air force and navy.”
Domestic Impact of Military Spending
A battle has raged in the academic literature for the bet-
ter part of 50 years over the economic impact of mili-
tary spending. Those who advocate the advantages of 
military spending focus on the boost to employment, the 
contribution to infrastructure development, and the effect 
of scientifi c and technological spin-offs on the civilian 
economy. Those who focus on the disadvantages point to 
the way the military establishment monopolizes capital 
and robs the private sector of additional opportunities to 
grow.
These are not, of course, simply academic questions. If 
military spending is a drain on the overall economy, the 
policy imperative would be to shift government funds 
toward civilian investment. While some early studies 
emphasized the economic advantages of military spend-
ing, more recent studies at an international and U.S. level 
suggest otherwise.40 For instance, according to a 1996 
International Monetary Fund report, changes in military 
spending ratios would lead to rather dramatic increases in 
per capita output (14 percent increase in the case of Asia, 
for instance).41 Several studies in the United States, al-
though assessing a very different kind of economy, come 
to a similar conclusion. Davis and Ward, for instance, 
conclude that cuts in military spending would lead to di-
rect increases in GNP.42 Pollin and Garrett-Peltier con-
clude that a billion dollars in government spending in the 
military sector produces the lowest number of jobs rela-
tive to comparable investments in mass transit, educa-
tion, or health care.43
South Korea, too, has no shortage of studies. Some show 
a positive relationship between government investment 
in the economy and overall economic performance—
economic growth, after all, took place during a period of 
large military budgets. KIDA, for instance, argues that a 
signifi cant share of defense spending has contributed to 
value-added economic growth.44 Others, like Park Kun 
Young, assert that there is no signifi cant relationship.45 
Heo Uk has argued that, even if there is no positive rela-
tionship, a shift from military to nonmilitary expenditures 
would stimulate economic growth because nonmilitary 
government expenditures produce a net positive gain.46 
Similarly, Park Ju-hyun’s research suggests that both 
government (nonmilitary) and private R&D investments 
have greater positive impact on the economy than mili-
tary R&D (Table 1).47 Hamm Taik-young has dismissed 
the past economic advantages of South Korean military 
spending by pointing out that “the alleged economic ben-
efi ts of armament occurred only when the ROK received 
considerable U.S. military and economic aid.”48 Finally, 
some studies assert that military spending has very spe-
cifi c negative effects within South Korea, such as exces-
sive investment in the chemical industry in late 1970s, 
greater waste and ineffi ciency, infl ationary pressures, a 
ratcheting up of debt through foreign purchases, and an 
increase in the tax burden at the expense of the savings 
rate.49
Table 1: Contribution of Various Sectors to a 
Country’s Economy
Source: Park Ju-Hyun et al., “Economic Effects of Investment in 
Defense R&D,” in The Study of Defense Policy (Seoul: KIDA, 
2003), 135–59.
These are not academic questions in South Korea, as 
key policy institutions are involved in the debate. KIDA 
has conducted studies that demonstrate the various eco-
nomic virtues of military spending, demonstrating, for 
instance, that military investment produces slightly more 
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jobs than the industry average.50 (Table 2) At the same 
time, KIDA studies have also shown that, if the Korean 
government were to increase military spending to exer-
cise full control of its defense, the country would lose 1 
trillion won in opportunity costs over fi ve years because 
money would go to an industry that is less productive in 
creating jobs and adding value.51 The National Assembly 
Budget Committee has argued the opposite, namely that 
import substitution in the defense sector saved more than 
6 trillion won from 1990 to 2001 but that “defense spend-
ing from 1980 to 2004 had a negative rather than positive 
effect on economic growth, because excessive import in-
ducement aggravated the trade balance.”52 The LG Eco-
nomic Research Institute, in a 1998 study, concluded that 
a reduction in military spending, and troop levels, would 
ultimately have a positive effect on growth and employ-
ment.53 And a more recent and comprehensive business 
analysis of defense industries argues that the defense 
sector provides considerably less value-added per capita 
than the industry average.54
Table 2: Effect of Defense Spending on Production 
and Employment
Source: Park Jae-ok, “Analysis of Defense Sector Contribution to 
Economic and Social Development” (Seoul: KIDA, 2 July 2008).
Central to any self-suffi cient military is an indigenous 
capacity to produce arms. The Park Chung-hee regime 
stressed the importance of heavy industry, whether ships 
or jet fi ghters, in building up the technological self-suf-
fi ciency of the country and reducing reliance on outside 
actors. This was equal parts national pride, strategic mili-
tary thinking, and a belief in the positive interactions be-
tween the military and civilian economies (through spin-
on and spin-off effects). In the U.S. context, economic 
benefi ts are usually expressed through spin-off: namely, 
the technologies developed by the military then revolu-
tionize the civilian sector (such as the Internet). But in 
Korea, as in Japan, the emphasis has been on spin-on: 
namely, the contributions that a developed civilian sector 
can have on the military (such as sophisticated commu-
nications technology). There have been some spin-offs in 
Korea, such as the kimchi refrigerator that took advantage 
of imported Russia military technology.55 With spin-ons, 
however, the Korean defense industry has leveraged the 
know-how and resource base of already powerful fi rms 
specializing in IT, electronics, shipbuilding, machine 
tools, and so on to turn ploughshares into swords.56
Now, after government assistance helped the defense 
industry through the diffi cult years when capacity rates 
were even lower than they are today and several fi rms 
went out of business, Korean fi rms make a range of prod-
ucts.57 These include the K-1 tank, the KDX destroyer, 
surface-to-air missile systems, short-range ballistic mis-
siles, and the K-9 howitzer. Between 2001 and 2007, 
when the Korean government focused investments in the 
IT sector, localization rates in defense sectors connected 
to IT and telecommunication rose from 72 percent to 85 
percent. A similar rate increase took place in precision 
guidance weapons (56 percent to 74 percent during the 
same period), but there was a slight decline in the rate 
for aerospace.58
Still, after enormous effort, South Korea is not self-suffi -
cient in arms production, except in a couple areas (small 
arms, ammunition, and armored vehicles). “Even after 
more than 30 years of signifi cant public and private in-
puts in infrastructure and technology, South Korea still 
possesses only limited capacities for self-reliant arms 
production,” conclude military analysts Richard A. Bitz-
inger and Mikyoung Kim. “In general, indigenous arms 
production has turned out to be neither technologically 
feasible nor cost-effective.”59 But that hasn’t stopped 
South Korea (and many other countries) from pursuing 
this chimera.60
Indigenous arms production, however, does not simply 
reduce the costs of foreign inputs. It can also boost the 
economy through exports, a particular focus of Roh Moo-
hyun.61 In 2006, Korean foreign military sales amounted 
to $250 million. By 2008, the fi gure had grown to more 
than $1 billion.62 These sales have included aircraft to 
Turkey, Indonesia, and the Philippines as well as war-
ships to Malaysia. Arms exports allow manufacturers 
to reap greater economies of scale, gain necessary hard 
currency, and increase employment in the defense sector. 
They also raise the capacity of Korean defense industries, 
which operated between 1999 and 2004 at a roughly 50 
percent rate compared with an industry average around 
the world of roughly 80 percent.63
Finally, there is the political impact of the industry. Un-
der Park Chung-hee, the military’s importance was not 
only in external deterrence but internal regime legitima-
cy. As a cornerstone of state power, the Korean military 
helped maintain the machinery of the coercive state.64 
But with democratization, defense spending became 
more externally focused even as it remained concentrat-
ed in a few businesses.65 Today there is some disagree-
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ment over whether a proper military-industrial complex 
has emerged in South Korea. “Defense contractors have 
very limited infl uence,” Moon Chung-in argues. Instead 
of responding to pressure from the defense industry, Kim 
Jong-dae says, “the Korean air force thinks about demand 
while reading U.S. catalogs.”66 But military analyst Suh 
Jae-jung identifi es the emergence of a “dense network 
between the government, the military, and the defense 
industry” that depends on government largesse, is staffed 
via a revolving door (326 retired offi cers working in 
defense industries in the mid-1990s), and is facilitated 
by research centers both inside and outside academia.67
All of this created a strong constituency that lobbied for 
more military spending, particularly if it meant lucrative 
contracts that relied on indigenous spin-on technologies.
Arms Race in Northeast Asia?
A fi nal economic consideration is the potential for a re-
gional arms race. Increased military spending in South 
Korea, if it generates reciprocal increases in Chinese or 
Japanese spending, could lead in turn to additional de-
fense outlays in the future.
Reports of an arms race in Asia are nothing new. “Asia 
is in the midst of its most peaceful period of the 20th 
century,” The Economist editorialized in 1993, “yet its 
nations are continuing to arm themselves at an alarming 
rate.”68 At that time, because he didn’t discern either a 
rapid rate of acquisition or a reciprocal dynamic, military 
analyst Desmond Ball refused to label these increased 
military spending levels an arms race. At the same time, 
he acknowledged that enhancements of airpower could 
trigger “unanticipated and undesired arms acquisition 
competitions” and acquisition of advanced submarine 
and antiship missiles could undermine regional securi-
ty.69 Fifteen years later, former Australian deputy secre-
tary of defense Richard Smith came to roughly the same 
conclusion about the current round of military spending 
increases in the region.70
And yet, South Korean military spending does seem to 
be affected by more than just the shadow of the North 
Korean threat, the anxiety of U.S. withdrawal, and a 
handful of domestic economic factors. In a conversation 
I had with KIDA researchers, they emphasized that South 
Korea had to recognize that its neighbors (United States, 
Japan, China, Russia) were modernizing military forces 
and expanding regional infl uence.71 Japan has already 
made progress toward acquiring a “normal” military pos-
ture, which might one day soon translate into a removal 
of the 1 percent-of-GDP ceiling on its defense budget.72
China’s military modernization, although not directed at 
South Korea, also forms the basis of future anxieties for 
South Korea. Although South Korea has usually empha-
sized the role military modernization plays in protecting 
commerce and in “peaceful diplomacy,” it has occasion-
ally let slip some underlying concerns. For instance, at 
a ceremony for the launch of a new 7,600-ton Aegis de-
stroyer, Roh Moo-hyun declared, “At the present time, 
Northeast Asia is still in an arms race, and we cannot just 
sit back and watch.” He was well aware that Japan had 
already deployed fi ve Aegis destroyers and that China 
was building four 7,000-ton class destroyers.73
Although South Korea is a relatively small country and its 
government claims that its modernization is strictly de-
fensive in scope, Defense Reform 2020 has nevertheless 
raised some eyebrows in turn. North Korea, of course, 
has denounced the South Korean military buildup.74 But 
Japan, too, has worried about the spending patterns of 
its putative ally. Japanese analyst Sugio Takahashi has 
written:
If the ROK develops its navy and air force with-
out expansion of the strategic horizons from 
Northeast Asia to the Asia-Pacifi c, the operation 
area of the modernized navy and air force will 
be assumed to be in Northeast Asia. This will 
cause concern in Japan that these modernized 
forces are actually deployed “against” Japan.75
With an eye on Korea’s largest neighbor, military analyst 
Nam Chang-hee has suggested “reducing and maintain-
ing the numbers of the ROK ground forces for defense-
only purposes” in order not to “raise any fears on China’s 
part regarding territorial confl ict over the contested area 
(Gando) in Manchuria with a future unifi ed Korea.”76
Conclusion: What Kind of Modernization?
As a result of the global economic crisis, government 
budgets around the world are shrinking. In Northeast 
Asia, however, the military portions of the governments 
seem to be shrink-proof. “Japan, Taiwan and South Ko-
rea could resist major cuts in defense spending in the 
short term due to commitments to ‘recapitalizing their 
militaries,’” according to Richard Bitzinger.77 China, too, 
is better positioned to maintain the pace of its military 
spending because it, alone among industrial powers, is 
still anticipating signifi cant, though reduced, growth next 
year.78
The South Korean economy during the fourth quarter 
of 2008 contracted for the fi rst time (on a year-on-year 
basis) since the onset of the Asian fi nancial crisis. Yet 
Defense Reform 2020 is proceeding with only modest 
changes. Lee Myung-bak has already signaled that he is 
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taking an “economy fi rst” approach by focusing on job 
creation in the defense sector, boosting arms exports, 
substituting imports for domestic production (such as 
buying used Apache helicopters), trimming unneces-
sary spending, and extending the timeline to 2025.79 The 
Defense Ministry also plans to increase the number of 
conscripts doing alternative service in industrial fi rms, 
build new apartments for service members, and apply 
new Green guidelines to military construction projects.80
As such, South Korea is edging toward a form of military 
Keynesianism: using defense subsidies to keep factories 
humming. The government is likely to employ other eco-
nomic arguments as well, such as asserting that military 
spending produces the stable environment necessary—
particularly at a time of more aggressive North Korean 
rhetoric—for attracting foreign direct investment.81
The evidence, however, that government investments 
in the military—at a time of plenty or paucity—are the 
best growth stimulus is quite weak. Military investments 
produce jobs, generate some spin-off technologies, and 
take advantage of some spin-on developments. But other 
government investments contribute more to economic 
growth. Localization, meanwhile, does not make strict 
economic sense, given the opportunity costs, although 
establishing indigenous production for certain capacities, 
particularly in the software fi eld, is reasonable.82 Arms 
exports, although they reduce the costs of localization 
through economies of scale and boosting the operating ca-
pacity of defense sector manufacturing, put South Korea 
in a diffi cult position of muscling into a highly competi-
tive fi eld. Arms exports often come with strings – such as 
reciprocal purchases. Moreover given the arms race dy-
namic in the region—and spending has taken place at a 
faster clip now than 15 years ago (Table 3)—government 
investments even into potentially lucrative arms export 
sectors can be counterproductive.  And armaments, as 
the United States discovered with al Qaeda, have a tricky 
habit of ending up in the hands of those against whom 
increased military budgets are intended to protect.
Ultimately, however, these arguments based on eco-
nomic rationales are irrelevant. The Korean government 
has ignored economic feasibility in the past when allo-
cating money to the military. The push for localization 
has more to do with nationalism than economic neces-
sity (and echoes North Korea’s vain efforts to achieve 
food self-suffi ciency). Many of the specifi cally economic 
arguments—such as the necessity of devoting a certain 
percentage of the GDP to the military—are arbitrary.83 
Government subsidies of the military, as evidenced by the 
“national security exception” in free trade agreements, 
lie outside the realm of so-called economic laws.84
If the economic arguments for increasing military spend-
ing are either weak, counterproductive, or irrelevant, why 
should South Korea continue with Defense Reform 2020, 
particularly at a time of global economic crisis? Counter-
ing North Korea doesn’t require such an upgrade. Re-
placing U.S. capabilities is sensible—if indeed the Unit-
ed States plans to pull out—but only defers the question: 
what are all the new weapons for? South Korea cannot 
compete with Japan, China, or Russia militarily—certain 
aspirations to superpower status notwithstanding—and 
its own modernization plans may only encourage greater 
spending among its neighbors.
From the perspective of comparative advantage, then, 
South Korea should focus on its “soft power,” which 
has garnered accolades from both within and outside the 
country.85 And it should focus government investments 
not on the military but on the “green” stimulus that Lee 
Myung-bak has launched. South Korean diplomacy and 
green technology: such smart power makes more eco-
nomic—and geopolitical—sense than preparing to fi ght 
last century’s wars or helping to create the future insecu-
rity that Defense Reform 2020 was meant to address. 
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